Article 1 Purposes and Policies of the UCC: Impact Cases

In approaching the text of the Uniform Commercial Code, it is critical to remember that Article 1 applies to every transaction under the UCC:

This article applies to a transaction to the extent that it is governed by another article of the Uniform Commercial Code.  Section 1-102

Hence, in any UCC transaction, there will always be at least two Articles which are activated—Article 1 and the substantive content area involved, e.g. Sales, Leases, Negotiable Instruments, Bank Deposits and Collections, Electronic Funds Transfers, Letters of Credit, Documents of Title and Secured Transactions.  The application of Article 1 to any of the substantive Articles can have an enormous impact on the transaction, and the interpretation of the documents governing the transaction.

The next series of blogs will discuss the impact of Article 1 on transactions governed by the UCC.  The starting point for this analysis is Section 1-103 which sets forth rules for the construction of the UCC as well as supplemental principles of law which impact UCC transactions.  Couched in general terms, these vital principles are often overlooked rather than utilized by the advocate and draftsperson.

Section 1-103(a) states:

(a)  The Uniform Commercial Code must be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies, which are:

(1)  to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial transactions;

(2)  to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties;

(3)  to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.

The advocate who properly utilizes Section 1-103(a) has a tremendous opportunity to guide the court to a desired result by properly aligning his or her case with the one or more enunciated policies to make that happen.  In looking at the language of Section 1-103(a)(1)(2)(3), it is clear that courts are directed to interpret and apply the Code in a particular manner;  the advocate merely acts as a guide by lining up appropriate purposes and polices to facilitate the court in this regard.

.Custom Communications Engineering, Inc. v. E.F. Johnson Co., 269 N.J. Super 531, 636 A. 2d 80; 22 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 971 (App. Div.1993) illustrates the importance of some of the policies stated in Section 1-103. In Custom, the critical issue on appeal was whether or not the four year statute of limitations for the sale of goods contained in the UCC applied to the matter under consideration by the court.  That in turn depended on whether or not the distributorship agreement between Custom and Johnson was to be characterized as a contract for the sale of goods in which case it would be governed by the UCC and its four year statute of limitations, or whether it was predominantly a services contract in which case it would be governed by the six year statute of limitations rule in effect for non UCC contracts..

The court used one of the standard tests in making its determination—the ‘predominant purpose’ test; i.e., was the contract under consideration predominantly a sales contract with incidental services, or was the contract predominantly a services contract with incidental sales. In reaching its conclusion that the contract was predominantly a sales contract, the court stated:

The common theme expressed in nearly all of the cases is that, although most dealership or distributorship agreements involve more than a mere sale of goods, the sales aspect of the relationship predominates. Custom  p. 84

The court found that the sales and distributorship agreement was predominantly a sale and hence that the transaction was governed by the UCC with the four year statute of limitations.  In reaching its decision, the court utilized the policy considerations stated in the Code:

We adopt the majority rule as sound, since it is entirely consistent with the underlying purposes of the UCC: to foster consistency and predictability in the commercial marketplace….This fundamental theme of the UCC is particularly pertinent in applying a statute of limitations to claims arising under Article 2.  The purpose of Section 7-725(1) is ‘to introduce a uniform statute of limitations for sales contracts’ thus eliminating jurisdictional variations. Id

In any situation the advocate has great creative flexibility to facilitate a desired result, by lining up the facts of his or her case with applicable purposes and policies and guiding the court accordingly.

Your feedback and discussions are welcomed.

Robert LeVine, Professor, Author the book The Uniform Commercial Code Made Easy

Follow our blog on Facebook and Twitter

UCC – The Reply Doctrine & The Statute of Frauds

The basic rule for the enforceability of a sales contract under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code is stated under Section 2-201(1):

Except as otherwise provided in this section, a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker…..

This is clear and unambiguous.  If the contract has a value of over $500.00 and it is not ‘signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought’, a lawsuit against that individual is not enforceable and will be dismissed.

This basic rule is subject to a major exception which can wreak havoc on the business which does not know of its existence or fails to comply with the guidelines of the exception.  Conversely, the rule protects a party who confirms a contract that is later disputed. The exception noted is found in Section 2-201(2):

Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has reason to know of its contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) against such party unless written notice of objection to its contents is given within ten days after it is received.

Simply stated, if a ‘merchant’ receives a written ‘confirmation’ of a purported contract which may or may not exist in reality, the merchant must send a ‘written notice of objection’ or he will have waived the protection provided by Section 2-201(1).  While this waiver does not result in an affirmation of the purported contract, it does mean that the party asserting the contract will not be barred by the Statute of Frauds.

Bazak Intern. Corp v. Tarrant Apparel Group, 378 F. Supp. 2d 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 58 UCC Rep Service 2d 612, clearly illustrates the impact of Section 2-201(2).  In that case, plaintiff Bazak contended that it had an agreement to purchase in excess of $1,000,000 worth of jeans from defendant Tarrant.  There was no written contract, although there was evidence of dealings between the parties, including a visit to Tarrants’ facilities by Bezak to inspect the jeans.

Defendant Tarrant moved for summary judgment on the basis that there was no written contract.  Plaintiff countered by introducing an e-mail which it alleged was a ‘confirmatory writing’ under the merchant exception to the Statute of Frauds.  The e-mail read in part as follows:

As per our agreement with Mr. Gerard Guez, we would like to inform you that Bazak International has bought the total inventory of 747,096 pcs per your Sep. 30, 2003 inventory report less the following:…The total inventory purchased is 687,896 pcs. Please send us a proforma invoice in order for us to proceed in preparing our L/C.  Please ship all samples per your conversation with Mr. Jacobi to Bazak International at the Address listed above

Tarrant did not object to the contents of the e-mail.

Tarrant contended that the e-mail did not satisfy the writing requirement of the Statute of Frauds, since e-mails were not specifically mentioned as a recognized form of writing under the Code. The court however, agreed with the Plaintiff, stating that:

‘…[T]he October 3 e-mail does, as a matter of law, satisfy this element.’ (Bazak), p. 383

Summary judgment was denied, and plaintiff was cleared to prove its case.

Parties who believe a contract for the sale of goods has been made should be advised to confirm those contracts per Section 2-201(2).  It is further advised that the language of the statute should be tracked in making this confirmation.  Conversely, if a writing ‘confirming’ a contract is received, and the party receiving it disputes the formation of the contract, that party must object within ten days, or it will lose the defense of the Statute of Frauds.  Obviously, this requires diligent review of all correspondence to the business, and as seen in the Bazak case, emails have been held to be an acceptable form of communication and confirmation within Section 2-201(2).

Robert LeVine, Author of the book The Uniform Commercial Code Made Easy