UCC Supplemental General Principles of Law: Potential Impact Can Be Huge

bookcover-for-facebook1.jpgAs stated in an earlier Blog, it is my belief that Article 1 is the most important Article under the Uniform Commercial Code.  One of the many reasons I believe this to be the case is found in the text of Section 1-103(b).  That section states as follows:

Unless displaced by the particular provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to the capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppels, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, and other validating and invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions.

The potential impact of Section 1-103(b) is enormous.  The essence of the section is that unless the Uniform Commercial Code specifically displaces a substantive principle of law, including, but not limited to those listed, those principles of law survive the enactment of the UCC and ‘supplement’ its provisions.

In Re Invenux, Inc. 298 B.R. 442 (Bkrtcy. D. Colo. 2003), 51 UCC Rep Serv 2d, clearly illustrates the impact of Section 1-103.  The case was  before the court on defendant/trustee’s motion to dismiss and plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.

In its Motion for summary judgment plaintiff was seeking a reformation of the Security Agreement between itself and Debtor.  The court noted that:

Although the UCC-1 financing statement which Plaintiff filed to perfect its security interest is worded broadly enough to embrace an interest in the Stock [the collateral], it does not appear as part of the collateral in the security agreement.  In Re Invenux, Inc. at 445-446

In order for a security interest to be enforceable, Section 9-203(b)(3)(A) requires that a description of the collateral be contained in the security agreement. Section 9-203 provides in relevant part as follows:

(a)     A security interest attaches to collateral when it becomes enforceable against the debtor with respect to the collateral, unless an agreement expressly postpones the time of attachment.

(b)    Except as otherwise provided in subsections (c) through (i), a security interest is enforceable against the debtor and third parties with respect to the collateral only if:

(1)    value has been given;

(2)    the debtor has rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in the collateral to a secured party; and

(3)    One of the following conditions has been met:

(A)   the debtor has authenticated a security agreement that provides a description of the collateral….

(B)   – (D) …

It is clear from the language of Section 9-203(b)(3)(A) [the other sections do not apply in the case] that in order for the security interest to be enforceable, the debtor must have authenticated a security agreement and such agreement must provide a description of the collateral.

The trustee took the position that since there was no description as required by Section 9-203, the security agreement was invalid.  The court framed the issue as follows:

The issue for this Court is whether Colo. Rev. Stat. Section 4—9—203 displaces Colorado’s common law such that the right of reformation due to mutual mistake—a common law right available to contracting parties generally—is not available to parties intending to create a security agreement under Article 9 of the U.C.C. id at 446

In finding for the Plaintiff on this point of law, the court said:

There is no question that Section 4—9—203 is in the nature of a statute of frauds because it requires a security agreement to be in writing. Colo.Rev.Stat. Section 4—9—203 Commernt 3.  But the fact that an agreement must be in writing to satisfy a statute of frauds is not inconsistent with reformation of that written agreement if, by reason of mutual mistake, the true agreement of the parties is not expressed in the writing. id at 447

The court found that the security agreement was reformed per the common law of reformation and mutual mistake which existed in Colorado, and therefore, the fact that there was no written description of collateral as provided for in Section 9-203 did not render the security agreement unenforceable.

In Re Invenux powerfully illustrates the potential impact of Section 1-103 in its application of the general contract principles noted.  When one factors in the multitude of general contract principles which apply and supplement the UCC one can clearly begin to see the magnitude of Section 1-103 on the many contracts which exist under the UCC.  When one superimposes the many bodies of law which similarly apply, the power and pervasive applicability of Section 1-03 becomes very clear.

Robert M. LeVine, J.D., Adjunct Professor and UCC mentor. Visit our website for more information.

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Contact Rob at rob@ucc-madeeasy.com

Article 1: An Advocate’s and Drafter’s Best Friend

Article 1 of the Uniform Commercial Code is the most overlooked and critical Article of the Uniform Commercial Code.  No Article provides as much creative freedom in terms of drafting contracts and shaping litigation as Article 1. Of particular significance is the fact that Article 1 applies to all transactions under the Uniform Commercial Code, regardless of the substantive Articles which apply in a given situation.  This follows by reason of section 1-102 which states as follows:

This article applies to a transaction to the extent that it is governed by another article of the Uniform Commercial Code.

We have already discussed the very important definitions of ‘contract’ and ‘agreement’, defined in Article 1 in sections 1-201(b)(12) and 1-201(b)(3) respectively.  Likewise as to the very important connected definitions and application of ‘course of performance’, ‘course of dealing’, and ‘usage of trade’ under sections 1-303(a)(b)(c).

The next series of blogs are designed to guide the reader through a detailed analysis of Article 1.  In addition to discussing the meaning of the text, examples of the application of various sections will be undertaken.  Cases will also be used to illustrate certain concepts.

The starting point for analysis is the introductory language of section 1-103(a):

The Uniform Commercial Code must be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies…. [Emphasis added]

The importance of this language cannot be overestimated.  At the outset, the drafters are giving two very important mandates to the courts; one pertaining to the construction and application of the Uniform Commercial Code; the other pertaining to the utilization of policies upon which the Uniform Commercial Code was drafted.  The court is directed, in the first instance, to ‘liberally construe and apply’ the Uniform Commercial Code; in the second instance the court is directed to do so in a manner which ‘promotes the underlying purposes and policies’ of the Uniform Commercial Code.

The advocate, within the structure of this mandate, has extraordinary ability to shape litigation and guide the court to reach the desired result.  The essence of the strategy is to line up the interpretation of relevant statutory provisions and the facts of the case with enumerated policies which support the interpretation of the position being advocated.  This positioning provides enormous flexibility and creativity for advocates and drafters alike.  The manner for utilizing these concepts will be discussed in upcoming blogs.

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The Second Element of Contract: Application of the Uniform Commercial Code to the Agreement

At this point in our mission to “Learn the UCC”, we have discussed the first element in determining what a contract is under the Uniform Commercial Code: namely, the ‘agreement’ of the parties as determined by the application of the criteria stated in Section 1-203(b)(3).  As discussed in Blogs 4 – “What IS a Contract”  & 5 – “Course of Performance: Impact on Contract”, there are two more elements which must be addressed before one can determine what the contract is in reality, or if in fact there is a ‘legal obligation between the parties’.  These elements include the application of relevant UCC provisions to the agreement between the parties, and the application of supplemental general principles of law which are also applicable to the agreement.  It is only upon the application of these criteria to the parties’ agreement, that the ‘legal obligation’ among the parties can be determined.

The laws which apply to a sales contract under the Uniform Commercial Code are those laws contained in Article 2, Sales, and the laws contained in Article 1, General Provisions.  It is extremely important to remember at all times that Article 1 applies to the whole Uniform Commercial Code per section 1-102; hence, regardless of the substantive article which applies to a given transaction, it will always be supplemented by the provisions of Article 1.  This is often overlooked, and in such a situation, a huge body of law, with enormous implications is not activated.

As we have already seen, the definition of ‘contract’ is found in Article 1 as are the terms comprising the definition of agreement.  Further, the application of these concepts as envisioned by Sections 1-201(b)(3) and 1-303, can have an enormous impact on the ultimate meaning of the parties agreement, and hence, their contract. Article 1 will be discussed in detail in upcoming Blogs.

Once the parties ‘agreement’ is determined, I believe that most logical next step is to determine whether or not the ‘agreement’ is enforceable under the Statute of Frauds.  While the totality of Article 1 applies to the ‘agreement’, it is irrelevant if the agreement itself has no legal import due to the Statute of Frauds.  The basic rule of Section 2-201(1), and the reply doctrine of Section 2-201(2), were discussed in Blog # 3 – “Monopoly and the UCC”.  If there is a written contract signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought, or the requisite confirmatory memoranda under Section 2-201(2), the contract is enforceable.  If however, neither of these criteria is met, there are still three possible exceptions to the writing requirement of Section 2-201(1).

Two of these exceptions are quite easy.  Under Section 2-201(3)(b), the contract is enforceable “if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was made”  Obviously, in such a situation, the contract has been admitted, and hence should be enforced.  Another situation which is very straightforward is the exception to the basic Statute of Frauds rule “with respect to goods for which payment has been made and accepted or which have been received and accepted”.  Payment for goods or acceptance of goods is an unmistakable statement that the contract exists.

The final exception is stated under Section 2-201(3)(a) which states as follows:

A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (1) but which is valid in other respects is enforceable

(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and are not suitable to sell to others in the ordinary course of the seller’s business and the seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has made either a substantial beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their procurement.

There are thus four questions which must be answered in order to determine if Section 2-201(3)(a) applies in a given case:

(a)    Are the goods to be specifically manufactured for the alleged buyer?

(b)    Are the goods in question suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller’s business?

(c)   Did the seller make the “substantial beginning” of the manufacture of the goods in question or “commitments for their [its] procurement”?

(d)   Was the foregoing done before notice of repudiation was received, and under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the goods are for the buyer?

In order for the contract to be enforceable under the Statute of Frauds per Section 2-201(3)(a), the questions must be answered as follows:

(a)   yes; (b) no; (c) yes; (d) yes.

The policy behind Section 2-201(3)(a) is predicated upon the commercial reality that a seller is unlikely to undertake the manufacture of a product which cannot be sold in the seller’s ordinary course of business for no reason.  Such a move, involving time and expense is unlikely to be undertaken if there wasn’t a basis, provided by the buyer, for the seller’s going forward.  It should be noted however, that even if the criteria of Section 2-201(3)(a) are satisfied, the seller will still have to prove his or her case, for the satisfaction of those criteria merely eliminates the barrier of the Statute of Frauds.  It does not result in a conclusive presumption that the seller is entitled to judgment.

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The Contract After the Agreement.

The recent sequence of Blogs began with one of the most fundamental, pervasive and important cornerstones of the Uniform Commercial Code: What is the contract between the parties? Our analysis began with section 1-201(b)(12) which states the basic definition of a “contract” under the Uniform Commercial Code:

“Contract”…means the total legal obligation that results from the parties agreement as determined by [the Uniform Commercial Code] as supplemented by any other applicable rules of law.  Section 1-201(b)(12)

The past three Blogs have focused on the first element: the parties agreement:  defined as:

…[T]he bargain of the parties in fact, as found in their language or inferred from other circumstances, including course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade as provided in Section 1-303.

The importance and potential impact ‘of  language, course of performance, and usage of trade’ have been demonstrated. Reported cases overwhelmingly support the importance of these concepts.  It must be remembered however, that these are listed as examples of ‘inferences from other circumstances’ are thus illustrative, not exclusive.  To the extent a favorable ‘inference’ can be made from ‘other circumstances’, the advocate has a vehicle to introduce evidence which can establish that result.

The basics of ‘agreement’ are now in place.  However, it is clear from a reading of Section 1-201(b)(12), that this is only one of three elements which must be looked at in determining what the ‘contract’ is:

The other two involve:

  1. The application of the laws of the Uniform Commercial Code to the ‘agreement’;
  2. Supplemental rules of law which may be applicable.

As will be seen in subsequent entries, both of the foregoing can have extraordinary and far reaching impact on what the end result of the ‘agreement’ is in reality.  The potential for favorable drafting of contracts, timely intermediate actions, and creative strategies for litigation will be interwoven into these discussions.

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Usage of Trade: Impact on Agreement

Usage of Trade: Impact on Agreement

Although there may be many agreements between parties which do not include a “course of performance” [Blog #5] or “course of dealing” [Blog #6], there will rarely be an agreement which does not have a “usage of trade”.

A “usage of trade” is any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question…. Section 1-303(c)

There are thus three vehicles through which a “usage of trade” can be established:

  1. Place
  2. Vocation
  3. Trade

As to each of these elements, there must be “a method of dealing having such regularity of observance…as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question”.  With that level of regularity, a “usage of trade” can literally change what otherwise appears to be the plain language of a contract.

An excellent illustration of the foregoing is found in the Illinois case of Ragus Co. v. City of Chicago  628 N.E. 2d 999 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).  In Ragus, the City of Chicago was seeking bids for a certain brand of rodent traps.  The announcement which the City put out called for: 150 cases of 5½” x 11”; 24 per case; 75 cases of 11” x 11”; 12/case.  Ragus submitted a bid that was accepted.

Ragus’ delivery to the City contained 150 cases containing 24 traps per case, and 75 cases with 12 per case.  The delivery was refused by the City because the tender by Ragus did not contain pairs of the rodent traps which was the expectation of the City; rather, the delivery contained individual traps.

Upon addressing the question of what the bid actually called for, the court found that the usage of trade required that the traps be delivered in pairs, and that therefore, the tender by Ragus was defective.

In reaching its decision, the court implied that an ambiguity of the contract made the inclusion of trade usage proper; however, no ambiguity is necessary to include usage of trade in the interpretation of the meaning of a contract.  Under Section 2-202(a), usage of trade may be used to supplement or explain the meaning of terms used in a contract regardless of whether or not there is an ambiguity.

One of the many interesting things about transactions governed by the Code is the fact that each industry brings its unique set of rules and customs into play, and in so doing can have a dramatic impact on what the terms of the contract are in fact. I recommend reviewing trade journals or other similar sources when dealing with Uniform Commercial Code transactions. Where time does not justify such a review, a simple search on Google will yield enough information quickly to create a framework from which to proceed.

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